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REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
The plethora of theories on aggression have emphasized many
differing causes of aggression, such as:

innate, unlearned aspects

(Ardrey, 1966; Freud, 1920/1965; Lorenz, 1966); situational determinants
(Berkowitz, 1965; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939);
learned habits (Berkowitz, 1965); fantasy (Feshbach, 1955); modeling
(Bandura & Walters, 1963); and reinforcement (Buss, 1971).

Researchers

have constructed as nany different definitions of aggression as they
have hypothesized causes of aggression.

MOst theorists' definitions of

aggression are directly related to their causes of aggression.

For

example, Lorenz, who supports an innate, unlearned position, made the
following statement regarding his book, On Aggression.

"The subject

of this book is aggression, that is to say the fighting instinct in
beast and man which is directed against members of the same species"
(p. ix).

Buss (1971), who believes that people aggress because they

were rewarded for aggressing, described an aggressor as a behavior
modifier.· He stated, all varieties of aggression "share a single
property:

one individual delivers noxious stimuli to another.

This

definition of aggression makes it nearly equivalent to punishment"
(p. 9).

Since there is a relationship between theorists' causes of

aggression and their definitions, it is not surprising to find that no
one definition has had very wide appeal.

An excellent point was made by Johnson (1972) and Tedeschi,
Smith, and Brown (1974) that researchers haven't been able to agree
1

2

on a definition of aggression because aggression is not a unitary
concept.

There is no single process or concept of aggression.

The

above discussion suggests that there are many different types of
aggression which possibly correspond to the different causes of aggression.

There is some general agreement in the literature (Berkowitz,

1969; Buss, 1971; Tedeschi et al., 1974) for at least two different
aggression mechanisms:

angry and instrumental aggression.

aggression "is initiated by any anger-inducing stimuli:

,

of the presence of annoyers.

Angry

insult, attack,

These are cues for anger, which is

followed by aggression, the intent of which is to make the victim suffer"
(Buss, 1971, p. 10).

Inherent in this discussion of angry aggression,

there is the implicit assumption that increases in attack also lead to
increases in anger (Berkowitz & Geen, 1966; Geen, 1968, 1970).
Instrumental aggression "is initiated by either competition or a
desired reinforcer's being possessed by another person.

These are cues

for cold-blooded (non-angry) aggression, the intent of which is to win
the competition or acquire the reinforcer" (Buss, 1971, p. 10).

Angry

aggression is the focus for the remainder of this paper.
Dimensions of Angry Aggression
Within the research on angry aggression, definitions of aggression vary on three dimensions:

(a) Is the behavior which is considered

aggressive broad or narrow; (b) Is intent to harm another person essential
or nonessential; (c) Is the action illegitimate or antinormative or
unjustified or is this feature not important.

(These dimensions are

based on the work of Tedeschi et al., 1974.)
Kane, Doerge, and Tedeschi (1973) determined that in considering

. 3
the necessary prerequisites for labeling an act as aggression, experimenters and subjects utilize different information when they label
behavior.

The definition of aggression will be subdivided into two

sections:

information used by experimenters and information used by

subjects to define aggression.
Experimenter's labeling.

In regards to the first dimension,

there has been a wide range of behavior which has been labeled aggression.

Dollard et al. (1939) adopted a narrow definition.

They stated,

'~erbs

such as destroy, damage, torment, retaliate, hurt, blow up,

humiliate, insult, threaten, and intimidate refer to actions of an
aggressive nature" (p. 10). Olweus (1973), on the other hand, believed
that any type of discomfort caused by another's action should be called
aggression.

Tedeschi et al., (1974) presented an even broader

definition.

Aggression "involves constraint of another's behavioral

alternatives."
For the second dimension, intent, researchers have generally
agreed that the intent to harm is necessary for an act to be considered
aggression.

The intent of a subject's aggressive behavior cannot be

definitely determined.

However, researchers feel assured that in

certain controlled situations, subjects were acting with intent.

In

everyday situations it is generally agreed that intent cannot be as
clearly identified.
There are two common situations which are especially troublesome
for researchers.

First, it is generally acknowledged that accidents

should not be defined as aggression.

This could involve an additional

determination of whether an event is an accident or not.

Secondly,

4
most theorists do not label as aggressive the delivery of noxious
stimuli when it is part of a social role, e.g., fixing a tooth or
passing a sentence.

But there are ambiguous situations., Is a father

spanking his child because he is angry or because he feels it is his
duty as a parent?
For the third dimension, Kane et al. (1973) noted that
experimenters consider an act to be aggression even if there was no
indication that a subject was acting illegitimately.

In fact, experi-

'

menters label an act as aggression even if the subject was treating
another person just as the other person had treated the subject.
Subjects' labeling.

Tedeschi et al. (1974) maintained that any

act which constrains another's behavior alternatives and is perceived
as intentionally detrimental and as illegitimate will be labeled
aggression by subjects.

The question is not whether the confederate

really has the intent to do harm; rather it is whether the subject
believes the confederate intends to do harm; and whether the subject
judges the action to be illegitimate or antinormative.

Kane et al.

(1973) found that subjects must judge an act to be illegitimate (not
justified by the situation) before they will label an act as aggressive
and in this regard subjects differ from experimenters in their labeling
process.
Definition of terms.

For the purposes of this study, "provo-

cation" is the word used to describe the experimenter's perception of
the confederate's behavior toward the subject.

In order for it to be

labeled a provocation, two judgments are necessary:

(a) the

experimenter considered that the confederate's behavior limited the

5

subject's behavioral alternatives or caused the subject some dtscomfort
and (b) the experimenter judged that the confederate intended to harm
the subject.

"Attack" will describe the subject's perception of the

confederate's behavior toward the subject.

In this case three judg-

ments are necessary for the subject to label the confederate's behavior
as an attack.

The subject judged (a) that the confederate limited his

behavioral alternatives or caused him some discomfort; (b) that the
confederate intended to harm him; and (c) that the confederate's
~

'

behavior was illegitimate or unfair.

"Aggression" will be used to

describe the experimenter's perception of the subject's behavior towards
the confederate, and again the experimenter must make the same two
judgments noted above in order for the label, aggression, to apply.

The

experimenter believed (a) that the subject's action constrained the
confederate's behavioral alternatives or caused him discomfort and (b)
that the subject intended to harm the confederate.
ments occur in the following order:

These three judg-

the provocation occurs first,

then the subject may perceive the provocation as an attack or not, and
the subject may or may not aggress against the confederate (see
Figure 1).
There are three groups of factors which determine whether or
not a subject will label the provocation as an attack.

These factors

are environmental information, internal cues, and personality styles
or·traits (see Figure 1).

This study will focus on environmental

information as a determinant of aggression and of the subject's labeling
of attack.

Two pieces of information which influence a subject's

judgments about illegitimacy of harm-intending acts are level of prior

6

Figure 1.

A Schematic of Inputs Used in Making
Judgments about Aggression.

7

provocation and the causes or reasons for the provoker's behavior.
These two factors and their interrelation will be the primary focus for
the remainder of this paper.
Provocation Causes AngrY Aggression
An extensive list of causes of angry aggression would include

rude and unpleasant persons; threats to satisfaction of basic needs;
arbitrariness of a frustrator's behavior; maliciousness of a frustrator;
frustrations in an effort to gain status, security, and/or reputation;
•
, unreasonable demands; inability to retaliate; threat of provocation;
insults; and despair (Fawcett, 1971; Singer, 1971).

However, most of

the research has centered on frustration and provocation as the

two

most important external or environmental causes of aggression.
In the late 30's Dollard et al. (1939) put together a reactive
conception of aggression.

Initially, they stated,

'~he

occurrence of

aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration
and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to
some form of aggression" (p. 2).

Only

two

years later one of the

authors 01iller, 1941) changed this initial formulation and stated that
frustration can potentially produce a variety of different responses,
one of which is aggression.

It is now generally accepted that there

are many different responses that people can make to frustration
(Bilgard, Atkinson, & Atkinson, 1971).
In the subsequent research on the frustration-aggression
hypothesis, there has been a wide range of operational definitions of
frustration.

Frustration has been defined as an interruption of an

ongoing task (Gentry, 1970), losing when in competition with another

8

person (Epstein & Taylor, 1967), a person's failure at teaching
(Thompson, 1972), and provocation (Berkowitz, 1962).

Considering

these divergent definitions of frustration, it is understandable that
there have been some studies which have supported the frustrationaggression hypothesis and others which contradict it.
There has been some clarification regarding the operational
definition of frustration.

As early as 1966, Buss maintained that

frustration was a weak antecedent of aggression.

He claimed that

other researchers (Berkowitz, 1962) confounded frustration with provocation and this is the reason these studies supported a frustrationaggression hypothesis.

Buss believed that it was the provocation which

produced the aggression and found that verbal provocation led to
aggression and frustration did not.
Other studies have shown similar results.

Gillespie (1961)

and Geen and Berkowitz (1967) found that frustrated and insulted
subjects aggressed more than frustration-only subjects; and Geen (1968)
found that insulted subjects (provocation) aggressed more than
frustrated subjects.

The definitive study was done by Gentry (1970).

He tested the effects of pure frustration, pure provocation (insult),
and a combination of frustration plus provocation on subsequent
aggression.

Pure provocation produced more aggression than did a

·combination of frustration plus provocation which in turn resulted in
more aggression than pure frustration.

From the above research there

seems to be a consistent finding that attack·or frustration plus attack
lead to increases in angry aggression.
One study suggests that increases in pure frustration may lead

9

to increases in instrumental aggression.

Thompson (1971) found that

stronger frustration led to more aggression when aggression was effective
in overcoming the frustration.

Aggression in this experiment could be

more specifically called instrumental aggression.
There is some question in the literature over the type of
relationship that exists between provocation and aggression. · Buss (1961)
assumed that the tendency to aggress varied curvilinearly with the
intensity of provocation.
,
for physical provocation.
hypothesis.
shocks.

He believed that this was especially true
Knott and Drost (1972) tried to test this

They gave subjects a small, medium, or large number of

The subjects were then given an opportunity to aggress by

administering shock.

They found a linear relationship between intensity

of provocation and intensity of aggression.

They believed that the

large number of shocks was intended to be.a high level of provocation
but was actually a moderate level.

Epstein and Taylor (1967) and

Taylor (1967) also found a linear relationship between intensity of
provocation and intensity of aggression.

The evidence supports the

hypothesis that there is a linear relationship between provocation and
aggression.

Thus, hypothesis 1 is that high provocation will result in

more aggression than low provocation.

However, experimenters do not

and, naturally, will not deliver high provocation.

Thus, the relationship

appears linear for the range of provocations acceptable in laboratory
research.
As was mentioned above, the hypotheses regarding the causes of
aggression are directly related to the operational definitions of
provocation and aggression.

Therefore, techniques of inducing

10
provocation and measuring aggression will be examined.
Techniques for Inducing Provocation and Measuring Aggression
Buss Machine.

In a typical experiment using the Buss Machine

(Geen & Berkowitz, 1966), the experimenter outlined the experiment as
designed to measure performance in a problem solving task.

The subject

was told that he would be given a difficult problem to solve and his
solution would then be judged by another subject (actually an accomplice
or confederate), who communicated his evaluation by supposedly giving
,
the subject a number of electric shocks ranging from 1 to 10. The
confederate actually gave the subject one or seven shocks, no provocation and high provocation respectively.
a chance to shock the confederate.
the subject's discretion.

The subject was later given

These shocks were administered at

One shock indicated that the subject judged

the accomplice's solution to be very good and 10 indicated that he
judged the solution to be very poor.

The amount of aggression was

measured by the number and intensity of shock which the subject
administered.
Ethically, the Buss model has come under heavy criticism because
the pain administered is a noxious stimulus and because a high degree
of deception is necessary.

In regards to the former, it is clear that

subjects incur some physical and psychological stress.

The degree of

stress which is ethically tolerable is open for debate.

There are no

clear answers.

Almost everyone agrees (Crano & Brewer, 1973) that no

potentially permanent physical or psychological harm is permissible to
human subjects.

Gergen (1973) has called on psychologists to use their

mental energy to do research on the harmful effects of various

11

strategies.

Until it can be established that questionable research

strategies are not harmful, other potentially less harmful methods to
study aggression should be examined.
Sullivan and Deiker (1973) pooled the opinions of psychologists.
and students in universities on the use of deception and pain in
psychological experiments.
experiments.

They gave students and professors four

All experiments were described by an identical cover

story in which subjects were asked to volunteer for an experiment that
would involve learning a list of nonsense syllables.
the true nature of the experiment.

They were then told

One of the experiments examined

pain endurance and was described as one in which the volunteers would
receive electric shocks that other students had said were "definitely
uncomfortable, but by no means unbearable."

Seventy-two percent of

psychologists and 51% of the students said that the deception in this
study was unethical.

Forty-seven percent of psychologists and 18% of

students thought that it was unethical to use shock.

Fifty-seven

percent of psychologists and 56% of students thought that the use of
shock was not justified.

Although this hypothetical experiment differs

from the Buss-type experiment, there are many similarities in the degree
of deception and the degree of pain endured.

Thus, the opinions of the

professors and students should be considered in ethically evaluating
the Buss-type paradigm.
Crano and Brewer (1973) stated that the deliberate misrepresentation of the details of an experiment which is implicit in a cover
story is "undeniably" a violation of interpersonal trust and respect.
Whether this is justified for the sake of science is also open for

debate.

From another standpoint, Orne (1962), Kelman (1967), Argyris

(1968), and Schultz (1969) argued against the use of deception because
the behavior of the subject is not normal since it is a well known fact
that psychologists use deception in experiments.

They recommend that

scientists enlist the cooperation and collaboration of the subject
rather than fooling or manipulating htm.

The above comments suggest

that research on aggression should utilize other behavioral measures
in order to limit the use of deception and the use of pain as a noxious
•
7

stimulus until it is proven nonharmful.
Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

A partial review of the literature on

aggression produced only one strategy to measure aggression which substantially differed from the Buss model, which did not use shock, which
minimized deception, and which could be used with adults.

Berger and

Tedeschi (1969) used a modified version of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
as a behavioral measure of aggression with children.

Anchor and Cross

(1974) revised this strategy slightly for use with adults.

This game

is a conflict situation in which each of two players must select one
of two strategies (cooperation or competition) without any knowledge
of the other player's selection.

The goal for a person playing this

game is to win as much money or as many points as he can.

By choosing

one option a person is generally cooperating with the other player; and
by choosing the other option, he is competing_.
Game is a non-zero-sum or mixed-motive game.

The Prisoner's Dilemma
In constant-sum games,

which the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is not, the total payoff to the two
players is always a constant.

The larger the payoff to· one player, the

smaller is the payoff to the other.

In nonconstant-sum or mixed-motive

13
games, the payoff varies.
for both players.

One combination of moves has a high payoff

Another combination has the highest payoff for one

player and the lowest payoff for the other player.

The players have

partially common and partially opposed interests.
Since each player is given a choice between cooperating (C) and
competing (D), this leads to four possible outcomes or payoff
conditions, CC, CD, DC, DD.
a matrix (see Figure 2).

The payoffs are usually represented in

The number in the upper half of the box refers

to the payoff for person A and the lower half for person B.

It can be

readily seen that the highest payoff to both players is achieved when
they both are cooperative.

However, in many instances both people end

up playing competitively which results in the lowest possible payoff
for the two players.

The cause and nature of this dilemma can be

readily seen by looking at the analogy from which the game derived its
name.
Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district
attorney is certain that they are guilty of a specific crime, but
he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He
points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to
confess to the crime the police are sure they have committed, or
not to confess. ·If they both do not confess, then the district
attorney states he will book them on some very minor trumped-up
charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a weapon,
and they will both receive minor punishment; if they both confess
they will be prosecuted but he will recommend less than the most
severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not,
then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning
state's evidence whereas the latter will get the book slapped
at him (Luce & Raiffa, 1958, p. 95).
The best outcome for both prisoners results

~f

neither confesses (CC).

But the best possible outcome for one person is achieved if he confesses
CDC or CD) and the other does not.

If each one is motivated to maximize
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Person A
Cooperative
Response (C)

9

Competitive
Response (D)

10

(R)

(T)

Cooperative
Response (C)
9

Person B

(R)

-1

(S)

0

(P)

•

-1

(S)

0

(P)

Competitive
Response (D)
10

(T)

Payoff Labels
R • Reward
T • Temptation
S • Sucker
P • Punishment

Figure 2.

An Example of a Payoff Matrix for the
· Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Person A's
payoff is in the upper half of the
box. Person B's is in the lower half.
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his own gain, the lowest payoff results (DD).
In experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, one frequently
used dependent measure is the percentage of competitive or cooperative
choices.

This measure was used by Berger and Tedeschi (1969) who

also developed another dependent measure of aggression.
seven trials of the game, they injected a zap option.

After each
One subject

playing the game (actually, he was the only subject since the other
player was a confederate) was given the opportunity to take $10 of
r

play money from the other person.

A subject could not gain when he

used the option because he was assessed a fee which ranged from $2 to
$11.

The subjects in this experiment were children and the money which

they won was traded in for M & M candy at the end of the game.

Anchor

and Cross (1974) used the same procedure with adults except each dollar
won could be redeemed for a penny.

Berger and Tedeschi stated that the

zap option was a ."behavioral response that can be unambiguously interpreted as

ha~intending

aggression directed toward another person."

The zap option restricts the outcome for the opponent by taking money
away from him; and when the subject uses the option, he is intending
to harm the opponent because there is no gain for the subject.
Therefore, the zap option qualifies as an operational definition of
aggression for expertmenters.
The number of competitive responses is not clearly a measure of
aggression as defined in this paper.

The competitive response clearly

causes the confederate harm (the lowest payoff).

However, since the

subject also obtains the highest possible payoff, the motivation of
the subject cannot be clearly judged.

Is he using the competitive
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response to maximize his own gain (instrumental aggression) or to
minimize the confederate's gain (angry aggression)?
It is necessary to present a short review of the r,esearch which
pertains to the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the present
experiment.

In some studies one of the players' game strategy was

determined by the experimenter.

Such a predetermined strategy was used

in this experiment in order to present each subject with the same
situation.

Various strategies have been used:

a randomized strategy,

a tit-for-tat strategy in which the experimenter selects the response
which the subject gave on the previous trial, a progressively increasing
cooperative strategy, etc.

Since the strategy is not the area of concern

for the present experiment, a randomized schedule was used.

In this

strategy the experimenter makes the same move for all subjects on the
nth trial.

The schedule is randomly predetermined according to a

specified percentage of cooperative responses.

MOst studies employ a

random schedule using a 50% cooperative and 50% competitive ratio.
Summers, Peirce, Olen, and Baranowski (1972) reported that most studies
in this area have

fo~d

that the experimenter's overall strategy has

had very little effect on subject's cooperative behavior.

Oskamp (1971)

in his review of the literature, found that big differences in strategy
(80% cooperative compared to 20% cooperative) led to differences in
cooperative behavior; but smaller differences (75% cooperative compared
to'50% cooperative) did not.

Thus within reasonable limits the

percentage of cooperative responses which the experimenter uses in a
randomized schedule is not a crucial variable in designing the
experiment.
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It has also been found that the values in the matrix affect
cooperative behavior.

Rapoport and Chammah (1965) used the following

terms to describe the different outcomes in the matrix:
punishment (P), temptation (T), and sucker (S).
to reward,

~to

reward (R),

In Figure 2,

sucker, T to temptation, and!. to punishment.

~refers.

The

relative values of the four outcomes influence the participants'
behavior.

Rapoport and Chammah reported that the index (R - P)/(T - S)

positively correlated with cooperative behavior.

Steele and Tedeschi

r

(1967) developed 208 different indexes and found that the index log
(T - S)/(R- P) had the highest correlation (r • .64) with the number
of competitive responses.

Steele and Tedeschi described more accurately

the relationship between the index and the proportion of cooperative
responses.

As the value of the ratio (R - P)/(T - S) increases, the

rate of cooperation also increases.

Jones, Steele, Gahagan, and Tedeschi

(1968) suggested that if a treatment condition is hypothesized to raise
the cooperative proportion, The Prisoner Dilemma Game will be more
sensitive to this when the value of the ratio is low and when sucker and
punishment have negative payoff values.

The value of the ratio is an

important determinant of cooperative behavior and needs to be set at a
value such that changes in behavior can occur and can be measured.
In both studies which used the zap option as a measure of
aggression, subjects redeemed the play money which they won for real
money or M & Ms.

There are conflicting results in the literature

regarding the effect of money payoffs on the percentage of cooperative
responses.

Gumpert, Deutsch, and Epstein (1969) found no change in

competitive responses when players were playing for real or imaginary
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money.

Oskamp and Kleinke (1970) found some evidence that real money

payoffs actually decreased the percentage of cooperative behavior.

On

the other hand, Solomon and Kaufman (1972) found that real money increased cooperative behavior.
is unclear.

Thus~

the effect of real money payoffs

Regardless of the effect, real money is necessary for the

zap option to be considered a measure of angry aggression.

If money

is not used, one of the main motives of subjects would be to beat the
other player, and it ,would be a good game strategy to use the zap option.
In this case the zap option might be a measure of instrumental aggres-

sion.

By using money and by emphasing in the instructions that the

purpose of the game is to see how many points you can accumulate and
how much money you can win, regardless of the other player's total, the
use of the zap option is harm-intending and a measure of angry
aggression rather than instrumental aggression.
Effect of Reasonableness of Provocation on Aggression
In the research on provocation, very little information was given
to the subject about the confederate's action which might
the subject's judgments.

c~nge

or alter

Other studies have found that the judgments

by the subject regarding attack are affected by his value system
(Blumenthal, Kahn, & Andrews, 1971), the characteristics of the provoker
(Albert, 1973; Schlenker & Tedeschi, 1972), and the behavior of others
with whom the subject has contact (Schachter & Singer, 1962).

Recent

findings in attribution research have focused on those variables that
affect people's judgments and these results have been applied to the
study of aggression.

Researchers have manipulated the cognitions which

the subject has about his level of arousal (Berkowitz, Lepinski, &
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Angulo, 1969), the source of his arousal (Geen, Rakosky, & Pigg, 1972;
Geen & Pigg, 1973), and the behavioral options which the subject has
available (Geen & Pigg, 1973).

But there has been limited work done on

whether attributions about the reasons or causes of the provoker's
actions will affect the subject's labeling of the provocation as attack
and his arousal as anger. 1 Reasons or causes of the provoker's behavior pertain primarily to judgments about the third condition,
illegitimacy, and possibly the second condition, intent to harm.
In the '50s and '60s, there was a group of studies which varied
the arbitrariness, reasonableness, or justifiableness of situations
and found that if a provocation occurred because of justifiable reasons,
then the subject aggressed less.

In the

~irst

experiment in this line

of research, Pastore (1952) presented some subjects with 10 nonjustifiable
events and other subjects with similar situations in which the provoker
had _some justification for his acts.

An example of the former is "Your

date phones at the last minute and breaks the appointment without an
adequate explanation."

In the justified condition, the statement was

changed to "Your date phones at the last minute and breaks the
appointment because she had suddenly become ill." The justified
statements elicited considerably fewer self-report aggressive responses.

lin the studies on the effect of provocation on aggression, it
seems very likely that the subjects labeled the provocation as
attack and, as a result, were angry and aggressed. In the
remainder of this paper, the labeling of_provocation as attack and
arousal as anger will be viewed as similar processes which occur
at the same time.
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Cohen (1955) and Rothaus and Worchel (1960) also used statements about
hypothetical situations and found that reasonable explanations reduced
aggression.
Kregarman and Worchel (1961) experimentally manipulated two
aspects of arbitrariness, reasonableness of a person's action and the
unexpectedness of a person's action.

Differences in reasonableness

did not result in differences in verbal aggression (self-report),
but unexpected events did lead to greater aggression.

However, the

r

authors stated that the instructions might not have been effective in
inducing two sufficiently extreme degrees of reasonableness.
(1965) experimentally varied the degree of justification.
were promised $2 if they succeeded at a task.

Fishman

Subjects

Some subjects didn't

succeed and were deprived of the $2 (justified).

Other subjects

succeeded, but the experimenter refused to.give them their money (nonjustified).

Subjects in the nonjustified condition expressed more

aggression.

These studies suggest that a reasonable explanation about ·

a provocation will result in less aggression than a nonjustified or
ambiguous explanation about a provocation (this line of reason will later
be used to support hypothesis 3).
Interaction of Reasonableness and Provocation
The section on attack indicated that increased provocation
resulted in increased aggression.

The section on justification suggested

that when a provocation is reasonable, people do not aggress as much
as when the provocation is unreasonable, arbitrary, or ambiguous.

Do

these two factors interact ·or will the effect of one override the effect
of the other?

Research has not focused on this question directly;

21
however, some related research will be examined.

Several studies have

found that theories which explain behavior at low levels of provocation
are not relevant at high levels.

For example, Baron (1973) found that

threatened retaliation reduced subsequent aggression when the subject
was not previously

anger~d,

but did not reduce aggression if the subject

was highly angered by the person who had threatened him.

Baron (1974)

stated that pain cues decreased aggression if the subject had not been
previously angered; but when the subject was angered, pain cues possibly
facilitated aggression.

This literature provides the basis for

hypothesis 5 which is that a reasonable explanation of a provocation will
not reduce aggression as much with high provocation as with low provocation.

More specifically, the difference in aggression between high

and low provocation for a reasonable explanation about a provocation will
be greater than the difference between high and low provocation for a
nonjustified or ambiguous explanation about a provoker.
Effect of Unreasonableness of Provocation on Aggression
Previous studies have not investigated the effect of an unreasonable

~lanation

of a provocation on aggression.

Since the

literature provided no indications of possible hypotheses relating
unreasonable explanation to aggression, a pilot study was done to
investigate the effect of an unreasonable attribution.

Subjects were

given a written description of the procedure involving the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game and the zap option (see Appendix E).

They were asked to

imagine that they were participating in a psychology experiment with a
hypothetical person named "Sam."

They were told that Sam used the zap

option on them six out of a possible ten times that he could have used
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the option.

It was also explained that before the experiment began,

they overheard Sam commenting to the experimenter about his personal
life.

Ten different comments which Sam supposedly made to the

experimenter, were presented.

Five of the comments were designed to

make Sam's behavior appear reasonable; five were designed to make
Sam's behavior appear unreasonable; and an additional condition was
included in which Sam didn't say anything to the experimenter.

It

should be noted that these studies were not direct explanations of the
r

provocation, that is, Sam's behavior.

Instead, the subjects had to

make an attribution that the situations mentioned in the comments
affected his behavior in the game.

One of the purposes of the pilot

was to determine whether the subjects believed that the stories made
Sam's behavior in the game more or less reasonable.
Subjects were asked to do three things:

to rate how reasonable

or unreasonable was Sam's behavior based on each piece of information;
to rank order the eleven situations placing first the situation which
made Sam's behavior the most reasonable; and to indicate if they would
feel hostile or concerned and if they would use the zap option (see
Appendix E) •
The information was pooled and the story that made Sam's
behavior appear the most reasonable was chosen and called the reasonable attribution.

The word "attribution" was used because the story

did not directly explain Sam's behavior.

Similarly, the comment that

made Sam's behavior appear the most unreasonable was chosen and called
the unreasonable attribution.

Also, the most unreasonable story was

compared to the no information or ambiguous situation.

The results
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indicated that there were no clear differences between these two
situations on any of the measures.

Thus, null hypothesis 2 suggests

that there will be no significant difference in aggression between an
unreasonable ·attribution about a provoker and no information about a
provoker.

It was also anticipated that there would not be an inter-

action effect between the effect of the attribution and the level of
provocation.

Specifically, it was anticipated that the difference in

aggression between high and low provocation for an unreasonable
attribution about a provoker will not be significantly greater than
the difference in aggression between high and low provocation for no
information about the provoker (null hypothesis 4).
Comparison of Two Theories of Aggression
Many of the studies discussed above have been interpreted as
supporting two divergent theories of aggression:
differential cognitive appraisal.

inhibition theory and

According to inhibition theory, low

aggressors are angry and have labeled the provocation as attack but do
not exhibit overt aggression because they inhibit the response.

A

differential cognitive appraisal theory predicts that low aggressors
are not angry and have not labeled the provocation as attack.

This

point of confusion may be clarified by comparing the anger ratings of
high aggressors and low aggressors.

Inhibition theory predicts that

there will be no difference in anger between the two groups and
differential cognitive appraisal does predict a difference.
Inhibition theory maintains that when a person is inhibiting
aggression, his original instigation to attack (anger) is present, but
he refrains from aggressing.

Dollard et al. (1939) maintained that
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fear of punishment is the inhibitor.

"The strength of inhibition of

any act of aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment
anticipated to be a consequence of that act" (p. 37).

Berkowitz (1962)

agreed that fear of punishment was an inhibitor, and he also added that
a person will inhibit an aggressive act if he believes his hostile act
will violate the standards of conduct

whi~h

he wants to uphold.

Staub

(1971) elaborated on Berkowitz's second inhibitor and stated that a
person feels anxiety or guilt when he anticipates violating a standard
,
of conduct. Staub also recognized one other, neglected inhibitor of
aggression, empathy.

Most writers have defined empathy as the ability

to know how another person feels and to have, to some degree, those same
feelings within oneself.
inhibition works.

None of the authors cited have discussed how

Each of the examples of inhibition seem to involve an

unpleasant emotion, such as fear, anxiety, guilt, pain, sorrow, etc.

A

person anticipates that he will feel one of these emotions if and when he
aggresses.

If the anticipated experience is sufficiently uncomfortable,

inhibition theory predicts that the person will usually inhibit an
aggressive response.

In summary, inhibition theory states that low

aggressors will be ready to counteraggress but will not aggress because
they believe it is not appropriate or it is immoral to aggress.

They

most likely anticipate the anxiety and guilt that they would feel if
they aggressed and this anticipation prevents them from aggressing.
Other theorists (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968; Schachter, 1964)
have emphasized that people make a cognitive appraisal of the situation
which then determines their emotions and their actions.

Geen (1968)

found that subjects label their arousal as anger and are more aggressive

25
if an aggressive cue, e.g., a gun, is present.

Schachter and Singer

(1962) specifically found that people use information given by another
person to form their labels for their emotional states.

All three of

these cognitive theorists maintain that a person cognitively evaluates
the information at hand to determine his emotion and/or action tendency.
These theorists suggest that low aggressors show less aggression because they have not labeled their arousal as anger (Schachter, 1964),
or have not evaluated the situation as threatening (Lazarus, 1968), or
,
have not decided that attack is the appropriate response tendency
(Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968).

On

all three cases, differential

cognitive appraisal predicts that low aggressors not only exhibit less
aggression but also feel less angry than high aggressors.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This experiment was designed to determine whether provocation
and attributions about provocations result in differences in subject
aggression and in self-reported anger.

In addition, the interaction

of provocation and attributions can be examined.

Provocation was

manipulated by varying the number of times (one or six) that the confederate will use the zap option of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in
the first 10 opportunities.

The zap option takes money away from the

oppos.ing player at a cost to the player using the option.

The zap

option has been considered to be a response which can be "unambiguously
interpreted as harm-intending aggression" (Berger & Tedeschi, 1969).
The subjects overheard three different conversations between the confederate and the experimenter about the causes of the confederate's
behavior.

Thus a 2 x 3 randomized group design with two levels of

provocation and three different attribution conditions was employed.
Aggression was measured by the number of times that the subject uses
the zap option.

Anger was measured by means of a self-rating.

This experiment extended the work of previous studies in three
ways.

First, this study investigated directly the effect of

attributions about provocations at different levels of provocation.
·Secondly, anger ratings were used to compare the.predictions from
inhibition theory and differential cognitive appraisal.

Thirdly, it

was determined whether subjects label the confederate's provocation in
this experiment as an attack, as subjects did the confederate's
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provocation using the Buss Machine as the vehicle for the provocation.

r

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
This completes the review of the literature pertaining to the
hypotheses tested in this experiment.
summarized.

The hypotheses will now be

First, a minor terminology change will be made in the

wording of the hypotheses as they appeared in the review of the
literature.

As the discussion of the pilot experiment indicated, a

direct reasonable or unreasonable explanation about a provocation was
not given.

Instead oubjects had to infer that the recent events in the

confederate's life caused his behavior during the game.

So, in the

description of the various conditions, the word "attribution" was
substituted for the word "explanation."

Secondly, since it was pre-

dicted from the pilot study that there would be no difference in
aggression between the unreasonable attribution groups and the ambiguous
attribution groups, the reasonable attribution groups were compared to
the combined unreasonable and ambiguous groups instead of just the
ambiguous groups, as was indicated in the review.of the literature.
This permits the five hypotheses to be evaluated by five orthogonal
comparisons· (Winer, 1971).
It was expected that:
1.

High provocation would result in more aggression than

provocation (the first main effect hypothesis).

lo~

(See Figure 3 for a

graphical presentation of the expected results if all five hypotheses
would be validated.)
2.

There would be no significan'f difference in aggression
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The Expected Mean Number of Zaps for Three
Attribution Conditions at Two Levels of
Provocation
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between an unreasonable attribution about a provoker and no information
about a provoker (a second main effect hypothesis, also a no effect or
null hypothesis).
3.

A reasonable attribution about a provoker would lead to less

aggression than either an unreasonable attribution about a provoker or
no information about a provoker (a third main effect hypothesis).
4.

The difference in aggression between high and low provocation

for an unreasonable attribution
about a provoker would not be signifi,
cantly greater than the difference in aggression between high and low
provocation for no information about a provoker (the first interaction
hypothesis, a no effect or null hypothesis).
5.

The difference in aggression between high and low provocation

for a reasonable attribution about a provoker would be greater than the
difference between high and low provocatiOn for either an unreasonable
attributiQn about a provoker or no information about a provoker (a
second interaction hypothesis).
This study also examined the difference in anger ratings in
order to compare inhibition theory and differential cognitive appraisal.
· Inhibition theory predicts that there would be no difference in anger
ratings between high aggressors and low aggressors.

Differential

cognitive appraisal predicts, on the other hand, that anger rating
would be greater for high aggressors than for low aggressors.

METHOD
Subjects and Confederate
Ninety, white male students enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at Indiana University, Purdue University Indianapolis participated in the experiment.
each cell.

Fifteen subjects were randomly assigned to

Although participating in psychology experiments is not

a course requirement, students were given extra credit for participating.

Subjects also earned a maximum of $3.00 and a minimum of

$2.00 in this experiment.

The confederate was a chubby, 22 year old

white, male, college senior who had a beard and mustache.
Design
A 2 x ·3 factorial design was used based upon two levels of
attack (high and low), and three attribution conditions (reasonable,
unreasonable, and ambiguous).

Fifteen subjects were randomly assigned

to each cell of the design.
Apparatus
In the room were chairs, a table, and a screen separating the
confederate's side from the subject's side.

In the middle of the

screen were the rules for the game (see Appendix A).

On each side of

the table was a stack of play money and two poker chips.

The

experimenter sat on one end of the table where there was a pencil and
a manilla folder.
Procedure
After the subject arrived, the subject and confederate were
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taken to the experimental room where the experimenter obtained the
subject's and confederate's name.
Then the experimenter said, "I am studying the effects of
different game strategies and game techniques on how much money people .
win and how people behave and feel in various types of situations.
You will have to make some decisions during this game which will determine how much money you win and I will also ask you to fill out a
questionnaire about how you feel.

I want you to fill out this question-

r

naire both before and after the game.
"The object of this game is to win as much play money and real
money as you can.

You each have $200 of play money to begin with.

you end up with $220, you will receive 20¢ of real money.

That is, for

every play dollar you win, I will give you a penny after the game.
is how the game is played.

If

Here

You both have identical red and white chips.

There will be 50 turns to this game, and on each turn all you have to
do is push the red or white chip towards me when I say, 'Go."'

(These

instructions are very similar to those of Anchor and Cross, 1974.)
"Now let's see how money is won and lost.
of each of you are four rules" (see Appendix A).
red chips, you each receive $12.

On the board in front
If both of you push

If you (subject) push the red one and

you (confederate) push the white one, you (subject) will lose $4 and
you (confederate) will win $15.

If you (subject) push the white one

and you (confederate) push the red one, you (subject) will receive $15
and you (confederate) will lose $4.
both of you will lose $3.
questions so far?

If you both push white chips,

Now that's all there is to the game.

Any

(The experimenter then paused to allow for any
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questions.)

Remember your job is to win as much money as you can.

are not in competition with each other.

You

Both of you have a stack of

money on your table and you are to take that money from the stack or
put it back on the stack when I tell you the results of each turn.
There is also one other aspect of this game.
moves, I will say the word 'Option.'

After each five

At this time you may raise your

hand which is closest to me or don't raise your hand.

If you raise

your hand, this means that you want to give up $4 of your money to the
r

bank and make the other player pay $20 of his money to the bank.

If

neither of you raise your hand within fifteen seconds, we'll just
continue playing as before.

If both of you raise your hand, then the

option will be in effect for both of you, that is you each will give up
$4 plus $20 or a total of $24.

I will say the word option after the

5th move, lOth move, 15th move, and so on.

The last option will come

after the 50th and final move.
"Here's bow we'll play.
example, 'Number 1, Go.'
white or red chip.

I'll say the number of the move, for

When I say 'Go,' be sure to push either your

Then after the 5th move, lOth move, and so on, I'll

say the word 'Option.'

Then you may raise your band if you want to.

Fifteen seconds after I say the word 'Option,' I'll tell you. if neither,
both or one of you raised your hand.

After each trial and after each

option, make the appropriate transaction with the bank. /~~~~!\~er{~"·,
questions?

/<v

LQYOLt: ~ /· .

1
:""-J

"Either of you may withdraw from this study at ~ny t:fllj.~labd''yo~'
will be given money for coming to the experiment.

· ·,

I~y~~/

continue, I would like you to sign this document of informed consent
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(see Appendix B) which is part of the standard procedure for people
participating in some psychological experiments.
"Now before we begin, I would like you to fill out this
questionnaire or checklist."

The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List

(Zuckerman, 1960; Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, & Valerius, 1964) (see
Appendix C) was administered.
The experimenter then asked if there were any questions.

The

subject overheard the, following conversation between the experimenter
and confederate if the subject was in the reasonable attribution
condition.
Experimenter (!):
Confederate (C):

Do you have any questions?
Well, sort of ••• after answering that questionnaire

I realize I've got something on my mind and I hope it doesn't
mess things up •••
E:

What is it?

C:

Well, I'm pretty uptight.

E:

Go ahead.

~:

A couple of days ago my wife was sick and I took her to
Community Hospital.

They gave her some medicine, but they

wanted to keep her for a day for observations and tests.
was two and a half days ago.
something wrong.

That

I'm really worried that there is

I've asked the doctors what's wrong and they

haven't given me or my wife an answer.
E:

I can see you are worried ••• ! don't know what to say.

You

caught me off guard •••• ! guess the only thing that is important
is that you can concentrate on the game.

Do you think that you
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can concentrate on the game?

C:

Yes, I believe so.

E:

Do you have any other questions?

£.: No.
E:

Do you (subject) have any questions?
Subjects in the unreasonable condition heard the following

conversation.
E:
C:

Do you have any questions?
•
Well; sort of ••• after answering that questionnaire I realize
I've got something on my mind and I hope it doesn't mess things
up. • •

E:

What is it?

C:

Well, ·r•m very angry.

E:

Go ahead.

C:

My steady girlfriend just called me and broke tonight's date
because she had the flu.

I know she had a sore throat, but even

if she was sick, she still could have gone out with me.

E:

I can see you are angry ••• ! don't know what to say.

You caught

me off guard •••• ! guess the only thing that is important is that
you can concentrate on the game.

Do you think that you can

concentrate on the game?

C:

Yes, I believe so.

·E:

Do you have any other questions?

C:

No.

E:

Do you (subject) have any questions?
Subjects in the ambiguous condition heard the following
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innocuous conversation.
E:

Do you have any questions?

C:

No.

~:

po you (subject) have any questions?
The experimenter then reminded them, "Remember, there is no

winner or loser in this game.
else.

Don't feel_ that you must defeat anyone

Your payoff does not depend on how much the other guy makes."

The confederate used the zap option one (low provocation) or
•
six {high provocation) times out of the ten opportunities. In the low
provocation condition, the confederate used the option on the fourth
opportunity.

In the high provocation condition, the confederate used

the option on the first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and ninth
opportunities.
The confederate played a 50% cooperative and 50% competitive
random schedule of responses.

After the game was completed, subjects

were again asked to complete the MUltiple Affect Adjective Check List

and several questions about the confederate's feelings to determine if
the subject was aware of the independent variable (see Appendix D).
The experimenter then debriefed the subjects, and any money which was
taken away because of the confederate's or subject's use of the option
was returned.

RESULTS

The two principal independent variables in this study were level
or provocation by a confederate and attributions about the reasonableness of the confederate's behavior.

Provocation was operationally

defined by the frequency of the use of the zap option in the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game by the confederate.
were used.

Two, fixed levels of provocation

Low provocation was defined as the confederate's use of the
r

zap option once during the ten opportunities to use the option.

High

provocation was defined as the confederate using the option six times
during the ten opportunities.
attribution.

The other independent variable was

There were three types of attributions.

In the ambiguous

attribution condition, no information was given to the subject about
recent events in the confederate's life.

The subject was free to assign

whatever motives he chose to the subject's actions.

In the reasonable

attribution condition, subjects overheard the confederate telling the
experimenter that he was very worried because his wife had recently and
unexpectedly been taken to the hospital for observation and tests.

In

the unreasonable attribution condition, subjects overheard the confederate telling the experimenter that he was very angry because the
confederate's girlfriend had called today and broke tonight's date
because she was sick.
The major dependent variables were aggression and anger ratings.
Aggression was defined as the number of times that the subject used the
zap option.

Anger was defined by the subject's score on the Multiple
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Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman, 1960; Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel,

& Valerius, 1964) after the game was completed.

The questionnaire was

also administered before the game to determine if any of the groups
significantly differed in anger level before the experiment began.
Effect of Provocation on Aggression
The data analysis is presented in four sections.

The first

section deals with the effect of provocation on aggression.

The first
'

hypothesis stated that subjects would aggress more if they were in the
,
high provocation condition than if they were in the low provocation
condition.

The mean number of "zaps" and the mean pretest and posttest

anger ratings for each of the six conditions are presented in Tables 1
and 2, respectively.

Under high provocation, subjects used a mean of

4.16 "zaps" as compared with a mean of 2.56 "zaps" under low provocation.
10.01,

This difference was statistically significant, F (1,84)
~

=

< .-. 005. . Subjects who were highly provoked did aggress more

against the confederate th&n subjects who were only slightly provoked
(hypothesis 1).
Effect of Attributions on Aggression
Checks on manipulation of attributions.

After the formal part

of the experiment was completed, the subjects were individually asked
to .rate on a 14 point scale how angry, worried, and happy the other
player felt (see Appendix D).· The purpose of this was to assess whether
the subjects heard and remembered the emotional feelings described by
the confederate in the two attribution conditions.

Subjects in the

reasonable (worried confederate) condition gave the confederate a mean
worry rating of 10.10 (very worried) compared to a mean worry rating
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Table 1
Mean Nuinber of "Zaps" for Three Attribution
Conditions at Two Levels of Provocacion

,
Level of
Provocation

Attribution Conditiona

Reasonable

Ambiguous

Unreasonable

Overall Mean

Low

2.00

3.40

2.27

2.56

High

5.07

3.80

3.60

4.16

Overall Mean

3.54

3.60

2.94

3.36

~ • 15 for each of the siX cells.
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Table 2
Mean Pretest and Posttest Anger Scores for ·
Three Attribution Conditions at Two
Levels of Provocation ·

Attribution Conditiona

Level of
Reasonable

Provocation

Ambiguous

Unreasonable

,
Pretest
Low

7.00

6.87

6.60

High

6.80

5.40

5.60

Post test
Low

8.13

7.13

8.33

High

8.00

6.80

7.00

aN • 15 for each of the six cells.
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of 6.03 for the confederate by the subjects in the no emotion or
ambiguous condition.
~

t (56) • 4.10,

This difference was statistically significant,

< .0005.

This indicates that there is a difference in

the degree of worry attributed to the confederate in the two different
conditions.

In addition, when the subjects were debriefed, 29 out of

30 subJect-~. who were''ln the reasonable attribution condition remembered
that the confederate's wife was in the hospital.

These results provide

evidence that the subject had heard and remembered the experimental
r

manipulation.
Subjects in the unreasonable and angry attribution condition
gave the confederate a mean anger rating of 9.93 (very angry) while
subjects in the ambiguous condition gave him a 5.43 mean anger rating.
This statistically significant difference,

~

(56)

= 4.55,

~

< .005,

indicates that s~b.fe~ts in the two groups -differed in the anger feelings
which they at~~J!I,bu~ed to the confederate.

Also, during the debriefing

27 out of 30 subjects in the unreasonable conditions recalled that the
confederate was angry because his girlfriend cancelled the date, and 25
out of 30 knew that shebroke
the date because she was sick.
.
...

...

.,.

~.·

Thus,

"

again there was evidence that most subjects heard the experimental
·· . ··-unipulation and could recall it.
From

t~e
. ~.....

'

above analysis, subjects knew how the confederate felt

-~ ':

'.".

. ·..·'

'.

·and most subjects remembered why he felt angry or worried.

In this

study it was expected that subjects would attribute the confederate's
emotion and this incident about his wife or girlfriend as causes of the
confederate's provocation during the experiment.

To determine whether

subjects made this attribution, the subjects were individually asked
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whether the confederate's mood influenced the way he played the game.
This questionnaire was given after the formal part of the experiment
was completed (see Appendix D).

Forty-four out of 56 subjects in the

reasonable and unreasonable groups indicated that his mood did influence how he played.

A chi square analysis indicated that this

difference was significant, x2 (1) = 18.29, ~ < .001.

This provides

some support for believing that subjects attributed the confederate's
mood as a cause of his behavior during the game.

Subjects were also

,
asked how did the confederate's mood influence his behavior during the
game.

Fifty percent of the subjects indicated that the incident with

his girlfriend or wife influenced how he felt.

These two pieces of data

provide some reason to believe that most subjects made the attribution
that the incidents influenced how the confederate felt which in turn
affected how he played the game.
Data analysis.

Since the subjects heard and remembered the

reasonable and unreasonable attributions, this section will evaluate
the effect of attributions on aggression.

Hypotheses 2 and 4 (null

hypotheses) were based on the pilot study in which the most unreasonable
attribution was chosen from the five unreasonable stories and compared
to the no information or ambiguous situation.

These results of the

pilot suggested that an unreasonable attribution would not alter
_aggression.
Both hypotheses 2 and 4, as they are stated, predict that there
would be no difference in aggression.
a difference between groups.

Usually, an hypothesis predicts

The experimenter, therefore, states a

null hypothesis with the hope of rejecting this hypothesis.

Hypotheses
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2 and 4 predict that the null hypothesis will not be rejected and the
probability level will be set at .10 instead of .OS.

Null hypothesis 2

states that there will be no significant difference in the number of
zaps between the unreasonable attribution groups and the ambiguous
groups.

The results can be seen in Table 1.

A non-significant main

effect for attribution provided some support for this null hypothesis.
The B2 term in Table 3 was not significant, F (1, 84)

= 1.16,

~

= .28.

An unreasonable attribution did not seem to affect aggression •
•

It was also predicted that a reasonable attribution about a
provoker would reduce aggression.

The reasonable attribution groups

were compared with the combined unreasonable and ambiguous groups.
This was done because it was expected a priori that there would be no
difference in aggression between these latter two groups.

The results

of the data analysis for hypothesis 2 are consistent with this
expectation.

Hypothesis 3 therefore states that in the combined

unreasonable and ambiguous groups the number of zaps would be greater
than in the reasonable attribution group.
attribution was expected.

A significant main effect of

The results are shown in Table 4.

The

orthogonal (Winer, 1971) main effect term in Table 3, B , evaluated
1
this hypothesis •. This term was not significant, F (1,84) • .25, ~'
and the data did not support the hypothesis.

In summary, neither rea-

sonable nor unreasonable attribution affected aggression.
Interactive Effect of Attribution and Provocation on Aggression
As was indicated above, the first hypothesis was supporte4 and
showed that the level of provocation influenced aggression.

Also, the

results for hypotheses 2 and 3 showed that attributions did not affect
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Table 3
ANOVA:

Preplanned, Orthogonal Comparisons
for "Zaps"

Source

df

MS

Provocation (A)

1

57.60

Attribution (B)

(2)

(8.09)

1

1.42

.25

1

6.67

1.16

(2)

(27.47)

1

24.20

4.20*

1

3.27

.51

84

5.76

B
1
B2
AxB
Ax Bl
Ax B
2
Ss within Gps

' * p <.os
** p < .01

,

:F

10.01**
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Table 4
Mean Number of "Zaps" in the Reasonable and Combined
Unreasonable and Ambiguous Conditions
at Two Levels of Provocation
Level of
Provocation

Reasonable

Combined Groups

Low

2.00

(N • 15)

2.83

(N • 30)

High

5.07

(N = 15)

3.70

(N = 30)
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aggression.

The present section will examine the interactive effect

of attributions and level of provocation on aggression.

The results of

the pilot suggested that an unreasonable attribution about a provoker
would not result in differences in aggression between high and low
provocation.

Null hypothesis 4 was tested by comparing the difference

in the number of zaps between high and low provocation for the unreasonable attribution groups with the difference in the number of
zaps between high and low provocation for the ambiguous groups.

As

•

can be seen in Figure 4 and Table 1, there was only a small nonsignificant difference between high and low provocation in these two
attribution conditions.

It was expected that the attribution by provo-

cation interaction term, Ax B , would not be significant. An
2
examination of Table 3 indicates that the interaction was not significant,

!
4.

(1,84) • .57,

~

• .54.

This provides some support for null hypothesis

Thus, unreasonable and ambiguous attributions did not differentially

influence the effect of the level of provocation on aggression.
Next the influence of a reasonable attribution and level of
provocation on aggression was examined.

It was expected that the effect

of high and low provocation on aggression would be influenced by the
reasonable attribution.

It was specifically predicted that there would

be a larger difference in aggression between high and low provocation
for the reasonable attribution conditions than between high and low
provocation for the combined unreasonable and ambiguous conditions.
The results are contained in Figure 5 and Table 4.

As can be seen from

the graph, the means for high and low provocation in the combined
ambiguous and unreasonable conditions differ by less than one zap.

While
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the means for high and low provocation in the reasonable conditions
differ by more than three zaps.

The orthogonal contrast (Winer, 1971)

used to test this hypothesis is the interaction term A x B contained
1
in Table 3. The provocation by attribution term was significant F (1,
84) • 4.20,

~

< .05.

This analysis provides support for the hypothesis

that the effect of level of provocation on subsequent aggression is
influenced by reasonable attributions.
The influence of a reasonable attribution on the effect of
•

provocation can be even more clearly seen by using a post hoc analysis
on the difference in aggression between levels of provocation for the
combined ambiguous and unreasonable groups and for the reasonable
groups.

Using the Tukey (b) test, there was no significant difference

in aggression between high and low provocation for the combined
ambiguous and unreasonable groups, but the difference in aggression
between high and low provocation for the reasonable attribution was
significant, !. (56) • 4.42, .E. < .01.

There was a significant difference

in aggression between levels of provocation when a reasonable
attribution was made about a provoker, but there was not a significant
difference in aggression between high and low provocation when no
attribution was made about the provoker or when an unreasonable
attribution was made.

In summary, provocation influenced aggression and

a reasonable attribution enhanced the effect of provocation on aggression.
AnSer Ratings
Check on manipulation.

It was expected that the experimental·

manipulations would result in an increase in anger and, therefore, any
aggression could be labeled angry aggression.

An increase in anger

so
ratings from pretest to postest would provide support for the effect
of the experimental manipulation.

The Multiple Affect Adjective

Checklist (see Appendix C) was administered before and after the formal
experiment.

The mean pretest anger score was 6. 38 and the mean post-

test anger score was 7.60.
• 15.87,

~

This difference was significant, F (1,84)

< .0005, indicating that anger increased during the

experiment and that the manipulation was successful in inducing anger.
Comparison of inhibition theory and differential cognitive
,
appraisal. The predictions of differential cognitive appraisal and
inhibition theory were tested by comparing the anger ratings of high
aggressors and low aggressors.
the number of "zaps" used.

The subjects were ranked in terms of

The low

aggre~sion

group was defined as

those subjects who used the zap option once or not at all.
29 subjects in this group.

There were

This was the bottom 32% of the distribution.

The.high aggression group was defined as those subjects who used the
zap option from five to 10 times.
group.

There were 24 subjects in this

This was the upper 27% of the distribution.

Inhibition

theory predicts that there will be no difference in anger ratings
between these two groups.

Differential cognitive appraisal predicts

that the high aggressors will have higher anger ratings.

Before this

hypothesis was tested, it was necessary to examine the differences in
anger scores before any experimental manipulations took place (pretest
scores).

The mean pretest anger ratings are presented in TableS.

As

can be seen, the low aggressors had a higher mean anger score than the
high aggressors.

This difference was evaluated by the Newman-Kuels

test and the difference between the groups was not significant,

~

(52)

=
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Table 5
Mean Pretest and Posttest Anger Ratings for
High and Low Aggressors

Aggressor
Groups

Low
High

(N • 29)

(N • 24)

Pretest

,

Post test

7.03

8.17

6.08

6.96
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1.05.

Thus, before the experimental manipulations took place the

high and low aggressors did not reliably differ in terms of their
level of anger.
Since the pretest scores did not differ significantly, the
posttest anger scores were next examined to compare the predictions of
the two theories.

The low aggression group again had a higher mean

reported anger score than the high aggression group which is counter
to the predictions of differential cognitive appraisal (see Table 5).
However, when the difference between the two groups on their posttest
scores was evaluated by the Newman-Kuels test, it was not significant,
~

(52) • 1.36.

in anger levels.
supported.

Differences in aggression were not related to differences
Thus, hypotheses one,

t~o,

four, and five were

Only hypothesis three was not supported.

DISCUSSION
Aggression Defined by the Zap Option
Several authors (Anchor & Cross, 1974; Berger & Tedeschi, 1969)
have stated that the zap option is a measure of aggression.
only two studies have used the zap option.

However,

Most of the studies in the

literature have used shock in connection with the Buss Machine as a
measure of aggression.

In this type of experiment provocation was

defined as the use of shock by the confederate on the subject and
aggression was defined as the use of shock by the subject on the confederate.

In the present experiment provocation was defined as the use

of the zap option by the confederate on the subject and aggression was
defined as the use of the zap option by the subject on the confederate.
The present experiment confirmed the finding of previous experiments
(Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Knott & Drost, 1972; Taylor, 1967) that high
provocation resulted in more aggression than low provocation.

Thus the

subjects in the present experiment responded behaviorally to provocation·
as they had in previous experiments.

These experiments have used a

between subjects design to compare subjects' anger ratings in the
provocation condition with different subjects' anger ratings in the no
provocation condition.
·to be more angry.

Subjects in the provocation condition were found

In the present experiment a within subjects design

was used to evaluate the effect of provocation on subjects' anger
ratings.

The increase in anger ratings from·pretest to posttest in-

dicated that subjects became more angry and labeled the provocation
53
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as an attack.

Thus, in terms of both behavior and cognitive labeling

(anger), subjects responded similarly to provocation as defined by the
use of the zap option as they did to the use of shock by the confederate.
These findings add support for the_zap option as a measure of aggression
and suggest that this strategy in connection with the Prisoner's Dilemma
game has the additional advantage of providing an alternative to electric
shock as an operational definition for both provocation ("zaps" by confederate) and aggression ("zaps" by subject).

This alternative to shock

is needed at this time since there has been much criticism about the use
of shock in psychology experiments.
Reasonable Attribution Determines the Effect of Provocation on Aggression
The results also indicate that the difference in aggression
between high ·and low provocation for a reasonable attribution about a
provoker was greater than the difference,between high and low provocation
for both an unreasonable attribution about a provoker and no
about a provoker.

inf~rmation

These different levels of. provocation seemed to have

little effect on aggression when they were used in connection with unreasonable or ambiguous attributions but seem to have dramatically
different effects when used with a reasonable attribution.

A reasonable

attribution under low provocation seemed to decrease aggression
(although not significant) but seemed to increase aggression under high
provocation (although not significant).

This finding seems to be in

agreement with recent studies in similar areas where interactional
effects have been found between provocation and attributed subject
variables.

Baron (1974) found that pain cues from the victim of

aggression tend to reduce aggression when the person was not previously
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aroused or when the person was moderately aroused (Baron, 1971); but
facilitated aggression when the aggressor was highly provoked by the
victim.

Baron (1973) also found a similar differential effect of

threatened retaliation.

Threateded retaliation from the confederate

reduced aggression when the aggressor was not provoked, but did not
reduce aggression when the aggressor was highly provoked.

These studies

point up the complexity of the area and the need to consider not only
the level of prior provocation, although level of provocation is a
,
powerful variable in and of itself, but also pain cues from the victim,
possibility of retaliation, and additional information about the
provoker.
Reasonable Attribution Reduced Aggression for questionnaire Studies
but Not for Experimental Studies
Attribution, when considered by itself, did not seem to have any
effect on aggression.

This is in contrast to prior studies which have

found main effects for attribution.

MOst of the previous studies in

this area have been questionnaire studies in which subjects were given
hypothetical situations and asked to imagine what they would do or how
they would feel.

In the present experiment, subjects were placed in a

situation.which was set up to be more life-like and, hopefully, the
subjects were more involved.

As a result, they are likely to have a

different reaction to the attributions.

For example, they are likely

to be more aroused in the present experimental study because money was
actually taken away from them.

Also, seeing and meeting a person may

affect the subject's willingness to take money away from him (Milgram,
1965).

In the pilot study which also involved a questionnaire pro-
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cedure, subjects were asked to imagine that they were highly provoked
by the confederate.

They were then told to indicate how many times

they would use the zap option.

The results of the pilot,study are in

accord with the previous questionnaire studies, subjects said they
would aggress less when they heard the reasonable story.

In further

support for this point, the only other experimental study (Kregarman

& Worchel, 1961) which used an experimental procedure did not find
differences in aggression as a function of differences in reasonabler

ness.

As the reader has seen, however, the students in the high

provocation behaved in just the reverse of what was expected.
Two aspects of the more life-like, experimental situation may
account for the difference in results between the questionnaire and
experimental studies.

First, in the.questionnaire study, subjects were

asked to imagine that the confederate took.money away from them six
times; and in the experimental study, the confederate actually took
money away from them six times.

The subjects may have been more highly

provoked or aroused by the confederate when he actually took money away
from them than when they just imagined that he did.

Thus, in a sense,

the experimental procedure could be considered a high provocation and
the questionnaire procedure a low provocation.

It has been demonstrated

in the present study that a reasonable attribution about a provoker
tends to reduce aggression under low provocation·but tends to increase
aggression under high provocation.

Thus, it is possible that the

reasonable attribution reduces aggression for the less provoking,
"imagination" procedure of the questionnaire studies, but. tended to
increase aggression for the more provoking, life-like, experimental
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procedure.

Differences in perceived level of provocation of the

questionnaire and experimental procedures may account for differences·
in aggression for these procedures.
Secondly, in the present experimental situation the subject muse
aggress against a person whom he has met and seen; and it has been
demonstrated that subjects aggress less against persons whom they have
met and have seen (Zimbardo, 1969).

Thus, differences between the two

procedures in anonymity of the victim of aggression may result in

,

differences in aggression between the questionnaire and experimental
procedure.

In summary, differences in the two strategies seem to result

in different subject responses to a reasonable attribution or
explanation.
Inhibition Theory vs. Differential Cognitive Appraisal as Explanations
of Aggression
This study also examined differences in anger ratings to determine
whether differential cognitive appraisal or inhibition theory seem to
better explain differences in subject aggression.

Since the two theories

apply only to angry aggression, it should be noted that subjects became
significantly more angry from the beginning to the end of the experiment
indicating that use of the zap option can be labeled as angry aggression
and that both theories would be applicable.

In order to determine

whether differential cognitive appraisal or inhibition theory explained
differences in aggression, anger ratings for subjects who used the zap
option most during the game (high aggressors) were compared with the
anger ratings for subjects who used the zap option the least (low
aggressors).

Differential cognitive appraisal predicts that high
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aggressors would have higher anger ratings than low aggressors.

In-

hibition theory predicts that there would be no difference in anger
scores between the high aggressors and the low aggressors.
hibition theory was supported.

Thus, in-

Also, there were no significant

differ~

ences in anger ratings for any of the conditions for which there were
significant differences in aggression.

This would seem to mean that

subjects utilized information about level of provocation and
attributions to inhibit aggression •
•

In a further test of the two theories, aggression scores for
individuals who had high posttest anger ratings (high anger) were
compared with the aggression scores for individuals who had low posttest
anger (low anger) ratings.

There was no significant difference in

aggression for the two groups, adding further support for inhibition
theory.

While the data suggest that inhibition theory better explains

subject aggression, there is a possibility that anger ratings taken
during the experiment would have supported differential cognitive
appraisal.

In the present experiment the anger rating scale was

administered after the game was over.

It is possible that the high

aggressors experienced some catharsis after aggressing (Hokanson &
Burgess, 1962) which may have reduced the intensity of anger ratings
which were taken after the experimental procedure was completed.

In a

future experiment the possibility could be tested by having subjects
ind~cate

their anger during the game as well as before and after the

game.
Only one previous study examined anger ratings for subjects
.who were highly provoked and moderately provoked.

In contrast to the
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present study, Knott and Drost (1972) found that people who were highly
provoked rated themselves as more angry than people who were moderately
provoked.

There are numerous differences between the present study and

the Knott and Drost study.

For example, the Knott and Drost study had

much less interaction between the subject and the confederate in their
"game" situation.

They also separated the provocation from aggression

and had two sets of provocations while the present experiment had only
one.

Their procedures increased fear and stress during the experiment
•
and the present experiment decreased anxiety. Because of these
differences and because there have been so few studies in this area, it
is impossible to sort out the reasons for the differing results.
Possibilities for Future Experiments
Another parameter influencing the effect of provocation on
aggression.

The present study demonstrated that the effect of

provocation on aggression is influenced by attributions about the
provoker.

Methodological differences among aggression studies suggest

another parameter which may influence the effect of provocation on
aggression.

In the present experiment there were 10 trials and on each

trial the confederate could "zap" the subject (provocation) and the
subject could "zap" the confederate (aggression).
using shock have restricted the use of shock.

Other experiments

For example, the

confederate would have 10 opportunities to shock the subject {provocation), followed by 10 additional opportunities for the confederate
to shock the subject.

These two designs differ in the amount of

interaction between the provoker and the aggressor.

Thus, there is

much more interaction between the confederate and the subject in the
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design used in the present experiment than in previous Buss-type
experiments.

This difference in the degree of interaction between these

two designs could alter the effect of provocation on aggression.

The

effect of this methodological difference will depend on the subject's
interpretation of the confederate's behavior in the high interaction
design.

In the high interaction design. the subject may realize that

when he uses the zap option, the confederate also has a chance to
retaliate.

However, there is no fear of retaliation from the confederate

in the low interaction design.

Studies on threat of retaliation

(Baron, 1973) suggest that there will be less aggression in the high
interaction design at low provocation; but there will be no difference
in aggression between the two designs at high provocation.
could also make a different interpretation.

The subject

In the high interaction

design, the subject may believe that the confederate is using the
option because the subject used the option.

For subjects who make this

type of attribution, the high interaction design may have the effect of
reducing aggression for both high and low provocation when compared to
the low interaction design.

The effect of provocation on aggression

should be investigated for both types of designs.
Effect of an unreasonable attribution.

The reasonable attribution

was an important parameter in determining the effect of level of provocation on aggression; but the unreasonable attribution did not influence
the effect of provocation on aggression when compared with the ambiguous
attribution.

However, several factors in the present experiment probably

reduced the effect of the unreasonable attribution.

In the unreasonable

condition the confederate had to act like he was angry because his girl
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friend canceled tonight's date because she was sick.

The confederate

for the present study had difficulty presenting himself as angry.
may have reduced the unreasonable aspect of the story.

This

In a future

study more attention should be given to the acting ability of the confederate.

Also, many of the students seemed to identify with the con-

federate because they believed he was losing his girlfriend.

Several

subjects said that the same thing had happened to them within the last
week.

In support of this possibility, the subjects in the unreasonable

.

.

condition not only gave the confederate a very high anger rating but also
a veri high worry rating on the post experimental questionnaire.

A

future experiment should try to eliminate such extraneous features from
the unreasonable story.
MOre explicit determination of attribution.

The present experi-

ment differed from previous attribution-aggression experiments in two
ways.

In most previous experiments the experimenter actually told the

subject that his behavior was a result of one or the other of several
events.

For example, in one study (Geen, Rakosky,

&

Pigg, 1972) a

provoker shocked (provocation) students as they read a sexually exciting
story.

One group of subjects was told by the experimenter that they

were aroused by the shocks and another group of subjects was told by the
experimenter that they were aroused by the story.

The present experiment

differed from the above example in that facts were presented about the
provoker's and not the subject's behavior.

Also, in the present experi-

ment, the experimenter did not tell the subject that the recent events
in the confederate's life caused the confederate's behavior during the
game.

The subjects had to make the attributions themselves.

Post-
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experimental questionnaire data suggested that subjects did make a
causal connection between the recent event and the confederate's
behavior during the game.

However, there was also evidence that some

subjects attributed the confederate's behavior to another source.

In

a post experimental interview some subjects spontaneously said that
they wanted to beat the other guy even though the directions stated
that they were not in competition with each other.

Since many subjects

felt this strong competitive urge and attributed their own behavior to
r

a need to win, it seems likely that they could also have attributed
the confederate's game behavior to competitiveness.

The present experi-

ment did not provide evidence about which attribution was more powerful.
A future experiment could determine the type of attributions that subjects
made.

This could be accomplished by having the experimenter make

attributions about the cause of the provoker's behavior and then determine the effect of the attributions on aggression.

For example, the

competitive attribution by subjects could be increased by having the
experimenter tell subjects that game behavior is influenced by competitiveness of the players.

The subject and confederate could also

take a test of competitiveness and the confederate's score would be
given to the subject.

The confederate, of course, would have a fixed,

high competitive score which, hopefully, would increase the competitive
attribution by the subjects.

The external event attribution could be

increased by having the experimenter indicate the importance of outside
events in determining game behavior.

Following this statement, the

experimenter could have the subject and confederate indicate to the
experimenter and to each other important recent events in their lives.
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Hopefully, subjects in this condition would more likely attribute the
confederate's behavior to the external event.

As was mentioned above,

this type of experiment would differ from previous attributionaggression experiments in that the attribution is made about the
provoker's behavior and not the subject's behavior.
A third condition could also be added in which no statement
would be made by the experimenter.

In this condition the subject would

make the attribution by himself. A comparison of the number of "zaps"
•
by subjects in the subject attribution condition with the number of
"zaps" by subjects in the two experimenter attribution conditions
would indicate which attribution the subject made (competitiveness or
external event).
In addition, the type of attribution that a subject makes by

himself about the causes of a provoker's behavior is likely to be
influenced by personality variables.
which should be considered are:

Important personality variables

trait hostility, trait anxiety,

internal-external locus of control, and empathy.

SUMMARY

This experiment was designed to determine whether level of
provocation and attributions about the provoker result in differences
in subject aggression and to determine whether differential cognitive

appraisal or inhibition theory better explain aggression.

Provocation

was manipulated by varying the number of times (one or six) that the
confederate used the zap option of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in the
10 opportunities.

Tne zap option takes money away from the opposing

player at a cost to the player using the option.
of attributions.

There were three types

In the ambiguous attribution condition, no information

was given to the subject about recent events in the confederate's life.
In the reasonable attribution condition, subjects overheard the confederate telling the experimenter that he was very worried because his
wife had recently and unexpectedly been taken to the hospital for
observation and tests.

In the unreasonable attribution condition,

subjects overheard the confederate telling the experimenter that he was
very angry because the confederate's girlfriend had called today and
broke tonight's date because she was sick.

Aggression was measured by

the number of times that the subject used the zap option in the 10
opportunities.

Anger was measured by means of a self-rating.

This was

a randomized group design with two levels of provocation and three
dif.ferent attribution conditions.
The results supported four of the five hypotheses.

High

provocation resulted in more aggression than low provocation.
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Subjects
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~t

only responded behaviorally to provocation as subjects did in

previous experiments when provocation and aggression were defined by
the use of

shock~

but they also labeled the provocations similarly.

Subjects' anger ratings increased from pretest to posttest indicating
that they labeled provocations as an attack as they did in previous
experiments.

These results provided support for the zap option as a

measure of aggression and as a definition of provocation.

It was

suggested that the zap option in connection with the Prisoner's Dilemma

,
Game is an adequate alternative to electric shock as an operational
definition for both provocation and aggression.
However, high provocation resulted in more aggression than low
provocation only in the reasonable attribution condition.

Level of

provocation had little effect on aggression when used in connection
with the unreasonable or ambiguous attributions.

This finding and

other similar findings point up the complexity of the area and the need
to consider more than just the level of prior provocation although level
of provocation is a powerful variable in and of itself.
Type of attribution, however, was not an important variable by
itself.

Most previous studies have found that a reasonable explanation

of a provocation reduced aggression when compared to an ambiguous or
nonjustified provocation.

However, these studies have been questionnaire

studies involving hypothetical situations.

In the present experiment

subjects were placed in a situation which was intended to be life-like.
It was suggested that differences in the experimental strategies seemed
to result in different aggression responses to the reasonable explanation
or attribution.
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In order to determine whether differential cognitive appraisal
or inhibition theory explained the above differences in subject
aggression, anger ratings for subjects who used the zap option most
(high aggressors) during the game were compared with anger ratings for .
subjects who used the zap option the least (low aggressors).
Differential cognitive appraisal predicts. that high aggressors would
have higher anger ratings than low aggressors.

Inhibition theory

predicts that there would be no difference in anger ratings between the
two groups.

"
Inhibition theory was supported.
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Choice and Payoff Sheet for Subjects

Payoff

Choice

YOU

HIM

YOU

HIM

Red

Red

$12

$12

White

Red

$15

-$4

White

-$4

$15

White

-$3

-$3

Red
White

r

r

APPENDIX B

78

Statement of Informed Consent

I, - - - - - - - - - - - - ' by signing this statement
(sign your name)
indicate that I understand the terms and procedures of this

•
experiment and I freely volunteer to participate.

APPENDIX C

The.following are the hostility and anxiety scales from the Zuckerman
(1960) Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist.
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Name------------AFFECT ADJECTIVE CHECK LIST

Below you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and
feelings. Put an "X" next to the words which describe how you feel
right now, that is, at this moment. Some of the words may sound ·alike,
but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings at
this time. Work rapidly.

1._afraid
2. _agreeable

•

18._frightened

34. _secure

19.

35.

furious

shaky

3._amiable

20.____good-natured

36. _steady

4. _angry

21. _happy

37. _stormy

5. _ _bitter

22._irritated

38. _ _sympathetic

6. _calm

23 .___Joyful

39._tame

7. _cheerful

24. _kindly

40. _tender

8. _contented

25. _loving

41. _tense

9. _cooperative

26.

-

mad

42. _terrified
· 43._thoughtful

10._cruel

27. _mean

!!._desperate

28.

12._disagreeable

29. _offended

45. _unsociable

13._discontented

30._outraged

46. _ _upset

14._disgusted

3l.___J)anicky

47. _vexed

15._enraged

32.___J)leasant

48. _willful

33.___j)Olite

49. _worrying

. -fearful

16.

17._friendly

nervous

44. _understanding

APPENDIX D

The following is the questionnaire the subject was asked to fill out
about the confederate.
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Questionnaire about the Other Player
Circle one of the numbers for each question below.
1.

What is your estimate of the other player's intelligence?

2
1
3
Low
Intelligence
2.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

. 12

14
13
Highly
Intelligent

Average

Do you agree with this statement?
I would like to get to know the other player better.

,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13
14
Strongly
Agree

10

11

12

14
13
Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree
3.

Do you agree with this statement?
The other. player is emotionally adjusted.

2
1
Strongly
Disagree
4.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

How did the other player feel during this game?
Circle one number for each feeling.
14
13
Very Happy

2
3
1
Not Happy

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

2
1
3
Not Worried

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

14
13
12
Very Worried

1

Not Angry

14
13
Very Angry
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5.

Do you think the other player's mood influenced the way he played
the game?

Yes

No

(Circle one.)

How?

6.

How tolerable or intolerable was the other player's behavior
during this game?

1
2
3
Completely
Intolerable

1.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12
13
14
Completely
Tolerable

How reasonable or unreasonable was the other player's behavior
during this game?

1
2
3
Completely
Unreasonable

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

14
12
13
Completely
Reasonable

APPENDIX E

The following is the material given to the subjects for the pilot

experiment.
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In this experiment we are interested in the judgments that
people in general make about behavior in a game.

Imagine participating

with a person, Sam, in a psychology experiment.

In this experiment you

and Sam played a game together to win real money.
game was to win as much money as you can.
turns for both of you to win money.

The object of the

There were 100 chances or

On every turn you and Sam had to

choose one of two moves, a cooperative move or a competitive move.

If

both of you chose the cooperative move, you each got 8¢ from the
,
experimenter. If you both chose a competitive move, you each gave 2¢
back to the experimenter.

If one of you chose the competitive move and

the other a cooperative move, the person who chose the competitive move
got 10¢ and the person who chose the
back to the experimenter.

coop~rative

move had to give 3¢

Neither of you knew what the other person

chose until after both of you had chosen. -For this part of the game,
you .each won about $2.50.
game.

However, there was another rule to this

After every 10 moves, the experimenter said the word "Option."

At this time both of you could push a telegraph key down.

The first

one to push the key down got the choice of whether or not he wanted
to use the option.

If one of you decided to use the option, this meant

that you wanted to give up 12¢ of the money you had won to the experimenter so that the other player had to pay 20¢ of his money to the
experimenter.

In other words the option took money away from the other

player but at a cost to the person using the option.
Sam had to use this option.

Neither you nor

During the experiment with you, Sam used

the option 6 out of a possible 10 times.

His action took $1.20 away

from you and it cost him 72¢ to use the option, that is, you both had
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to return money to the experimenter but you had to return more.

From

what you can determine, the use of the option did not benefit Sam.
However, before the experiment began, you

overhea~d

to the experimenter something about his personal life.
hear one of the comments on pages 3, 4, and 5.

Sam commenting

Assume that you

Please rate how reason-

able or unreasonable was Sam's behavior to you based on each piece of
information.

The rating scale for each piece of information is below

the information.

(Briefly look at page 3.) You are to circle one of
•
the numbers which indicates how reasonable are Sam's actions, given the
additional information which you overheard.
After rating the first one, go on and rate the second comment.
Consider each piece of information separately.

Do not carry in-

formation or judgments along from one situation to the next.
consider each comment on its own.
again before going on to your task.
feel free to ask them.

Try to

Please reread all the directions
If you have any questions, please

If, for any reason, you do not wish to continue

with the experiment, you are free to leave and you will be given credit
for participating.
experiments.)

(This is a standard procedure for psychology

Please reread the directions if you have not done so.
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Additional Information
RATE THESE STATEMENTS INDEPENDENTLY

1.

He is angry because his instructor sprung an unexpected, difficult,
and very important examination for which he was poorly prepared.
2

1

Completely
Reasonable
2.

He

3

4

Partly
Reasonable

is worried

be~use

5
Partly
Unreasonable

6

7

Completely
Unreasonable

the doctors at a local hospital haven't told

him about the condition of his wife who went to the hospital for
observations.

3.

4

3

2

1

Completely
Reasonable

Partly
Reasonable

6

5
Partly
Unreasonable

7

Completely
Unreasonable

He is very happy because he had just landed a part time job that
fit in with his schedule at school and the salary was a ridiculously
high $5.50/hr.

4.

3

2

1

4

Partly
Reasonable

Completely
Reasonable

5
Partly
Unreasonable

7

6

Completely
Unreasonable

He is angry because his steady date phoned and broke this evening's
date because she had suddenly become ill.
1

Completely
Reasonable

2

3

Partly
Reasonable

4

5

Partly
Unreasonable

6

7

Completely
Unreasonable
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5.

He is worried because a prof chose him and two others from a big
class to give speeches about their reports for the whole class
because they had the best reports.
1

2

Completely
Reasonable
6.

3

4

Partly
Reasonable

5

6

Partly
Unreasonable

7

Completely
Unreasonable

Assume that you did not hear the other person tell the experimenter
anything.
1

2

Completely
Reasonable
7.

3

4

Partly
Reasonable

5
Partly
Unreasonable

6

7

Completely
Unreasonable

He left a valuable article of his in a repair shop.

He's worried

because when he called at the appointed time, the repair man said
he didn't have it fixed because he had an illness in the family.
1

2

Completely
Reasonable
8.

3

4

5

6

Partly
Unreasonable

Partly
Reasonable

7

Completely
Unreasonable

He is angry because an.intimate friend while drunk spread rumors
to many people about him which were unjustified and somewhat
uncomplimentary.
1

Completely
Reasonable·

2

3

Partly
Reasonable

4

5

Partly
Unreasonable

6

7

Completely
Unreasonable
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9.

He said that he is a very competitive person and sametimes he gets
carried away.

He also said that sometimes his competitiveness

causes him some difficulty, but he's trying to overcome it.
1
Completely
Reasonable
10.

2

3

4

5

6

Partly
Unreasonable

Partly
Reasonable

7

Completely
Unreasonable

He is worried because his boss at work has reassigned him to a
position involving very menial work because of recent cutbacks in
federal funds.
1

2

11.

3

4

Partly
Reasonable

Completely
Reasonable

5
Partly
Unreasonable

7

6

Completely
Unreasonable

He is angry because this guy who sits next to him in class always
eomes in late and then asks him what has gone on in class.

The

prof seems to be disturbed by this repeated talking.
1

Completely
Reasonable

2

3

Partly
Reasonable

4

5

Partly
Unreasonable

6

7

Completely
Unreasonable
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For your second task, I'd like you to rank these 11 situations
in terms of how reasonable or understandable they are.

Put the number

of the situation which you feel makes Sam's behavior the,most reasonable
or understandable next to I 1 below.

And next ,to I 2 below, put the.

situation which makes Sam's behavior the next most reasonable; and so
on until you have ranked all the situations from the most reasonable
(#1) to the least reasonable (#11).

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
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Your last task is to reread each comment and then to pick one
of the six statements listed under each number which best describes
how you would feel and act if Sam was taking money away from you and
if you

ove~heard

each of the comments listed on pages 3, 4, 5.

Check

one statement for each number or comment.
In doing this task, you might think to yourself - if I overheard
comment one (or two and so on) and Sam then used the option to make me
return my winnings to the experimenter, which statement below best
describes how I would feel and what I would do.
1.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him _ __
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your .feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
2.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ____
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best describes

your feelings.·)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
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3.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him
times.

---

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
4.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ______
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn ··t show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
____ I
5.

wou~d

use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him ______
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
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6.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him
times.

------

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.

,
7. ____ I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him _____
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
8.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him _____
times.

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
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9.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him
times.

---

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
10.

I would feel hostile and I would use the option on him
times.

---

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.
11.

I would feel
times.

~ostile

and I would use the option on him ______

(Fill in the number if this statement best reflects

your feelings.)
I would feel hostile but I wouldn't show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned and I would show it in my behavior.
I would feel concerned but I would not show it.
I would not feel hostile or concerned.
I would use the option without feeling hostile or concerned.

APPENDIX F
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Summary of Pilot Study Data for the 11 Different Situations
Situation Ntimber
1

2a

3

4b

5

Ratingd

5.0

4.0

3.9

5.6

5.0

Rank Ordere

6.0

3.5

5.0

7.2

Hostility

10 , 2

10

Concern

10

22

Option

4

0

Measures

6c

8

9

10

11

3.8 5.3

4.4

2.8

4.4

4.0

7.3

7.6

7.2

6.0

4.6

5.9

5.9

8

6

8

7

8

9

5

10

3

8

10

3

10

11

8

15

12

3

3

0

4

2

3

5

1

2

7

Mean Scores

Total Scores

Note.

N • 29

~st reasonable attribution.

~ost unreasonable attribution
cNo information given by Sam, ambiguous attribution.
dLower the score the more reasonable the rating.
~er

the score the more reasonable the rank order.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by John F. Kremer has been read and
approved by the following Committee:

Dr. Emil J. Posavac, Chairman
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola
Dr. Alan S. DeWolfe
Professor, Psychology, Loyola
Dr. James E. Johnson
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation
and ~he signature which appears below verifies the fact that any
necessary c~nges have been incorporated and that the dissertation is
now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and
form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

September 23, 1975
Date

97

